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THE SENTENCING PROCESS
upheld as a reasonable exercise of official discretion, though perhaps
infringing on the student's constitutional right of privacy. In balancing
the "gravity of the 'evil' ,52 with the restraint on the right of privacy
and possible first amendment intrusions, courts will uphold, as a reason-
able exercise of official discretion, school regulations intended to avert
potential sources of harm. The source of harm need not in fact be
realized in the particular case for the regulation to be upheld. The
court in Ferrell may have adopted this position to discourage stu-
dents from testing these ad hoc rules at school, and subsequently
in court, and to insure an efficient education for a majority of
students, though curtailing a right of others. Adherence to such a policy
will build fences amounting to a corral for the "mustangs and maver-
icks ' 5 3 wishing to attend public school.
JoHN E. BUGG
Criminal Law-The Rehabilitative Ideal Activated by the
Sentencing Process
INTRODUCTION
All too often the concept of rehabilitation within the criminal process
is embraced by the academic community, but spurned by the black robes
of the judiciary. Archaic myths and prejudices, interwoven into the pur-
poses and goals of the criminal law, have resulted in an "antiquated crim-
inal code, which is riveted together by outworn tradition like the iron cuff
about the ankle of a chain gang prisoner,"1 and beyond which the judici-
ary, historically, has failed to see.
In the case of People v. Jones,' an Illinois Appellate Court clearly rec-
ognized the rehabilitative ideal within the criminal system and applied it
to a twenty year old high school boy. The defendant had been convicted
of involuntary manslaughter and sentenced to the state penitentiary for
not less than six nor more than ten years.3 The trial court found that the
12 392 F.2d at 702.
"' Pollit, Free Speech for Mustangs and Mavericks, 46 N.C.L. REv. 39, 54
(1967).
1 Note, Indeterminate Sentence Laws-The Adolescence of Peno-Correctional
Legislation, 50 HARV. L. REv. 677, 686 (1937).
2 Ill. App. 2d -, 235 N.E.2d 379 (1968).
'ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-3(c) (1) (Smith-Hurd 1964) reads as follows:
"A person convicted of involuntary manslaughter shall be imprisoned in the
penitentiary from one to ten years."
19681
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
accidental death of the defendant's friend had occurred while these two
and others were engaged in boyish horseplay involving a revolver that
discharged, critically wounding the deceased. Defendant cooperated fully
with the arresting officers. An aggravation and mitigation hearing4 by
the trial court disclosed that the defendant was a lifelong resident of
Chicago, single, a high school student, of the Baptist faith, and had no
previous criminal convictions, although he had been arrested on several
misdemeanor charges. The defendant appealed, contending that the sen-
tence, although within the statutory limits, was excessive. In considering
all the relevant factors, the appellate court said,
This is not the picture of a person beyond the reach of the rehabilita-
tive processes. The judge's explanation that: "We have had too many
of these accidents" evidences a failure to give proper weight to the
individual circumstances of the defendant. We feel that setting the
minimum sentence at six years and the maximum at ten years is not
in the best interest of either the community or the defendant.5
The judgment was accordingly modified to a minimum sentence of three
years and affirmed as modified.
In any other jurisdiction the Jones case might well have been a land-
mark decision. In Illinois it is simply another stage in the long trend of
cases 6 that clearly pay more than lip service to the goal of rehabilitation
of the individual offender.
THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL
This nation's penal system of justice and correction has developed
more from accretion than from any dynamic process or innovation. New
ideas were tacked onto the pre-existing structure with no effort to relate
the old to the new or to eliminate incompatible elements. Thus, the evol-
ving system became a paradoxical and inconsistent phenomenon working
"in ways that are unintended toward goals that are neither simple nor
'ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1-7(g) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967) reads as follows:
For the purpose of determining sentence to be imposed, the court shall,
after conviction, consider the evidence, if any, received upon the trial and
shall also hear and receive evidence, if any, as to the moral character, life,
family, occupation and criminal record of the offender and may consider
such evidence in aggravation or mitigation of the offense.
'- Ill. App. 2d at -, 235 N.E.2d at 381.
'See People v. Tice, 89 Ill. App. 2d 313, 231 N.E.2d 607 (1967); People v.
Nelson, 87 Il. App. 2d 159, 231 N.E.2d 115 (1967) ; People v. Lillie, 79 Ill. App,
2d 174, 223 N.E.2d 716 (1967) ; People v. Lannes, 78 Ill. App. 2d 45, 223 N.E.2d
440 (1966); People v. Carroll, 76 Ill. App. 2d 9, 221 N.E.2d 528 (1966); People
v. Brown, 60 Ill. App. 2d 447, 208 N.E.2d 629 (1965); People v. Evrard, 55 Ill,
App. 2d 270, 204 N.E.2d 777 (1965).
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precise.' 7 Though many of the non-utilitarian concepts, which were once
historically significant, have given way to modern methods and new ideas,
their presence, even within the shadows, tends to distort and confuse the
overall goals of the criminal process. Concepts of vindication, re-
tribution, and penitence have been superseded by concepts of neutraliza-
tion, reformation, and re-socialization ;8 but the lingering presence of the
former has significantly allied with concepts of deterrence and prevention
to weaken the latter. "It is far simpler to receive without challenge the
traditional philosophies and to employ well-established techniques. When
called upon, one may speak piously of the protection of society or indi-
vidualized rehabilitation, but these are bones without flesh." 9 Inevitably,
a balance is struck among the competing social interests on scales which
our criminal system calls justice.
As the criminal process has evolved, two major social goals have be-
come predominant: the protection of society and the preservation of hu-
man dignity via the rehabilitative ideal.'0 Since the innovation of proba-
tion over a century ago," modern correctional attitudes and ideas have
slowly generated change in the philosophy of penology, introducing such
concepts as the indeterminate sentence, parole, half-way houses, work-
release, and furloughs. 2 In the years after the first world war the social
sciences began applying behavioral disciplines to areas of correction. These
behavioral science contributions were expressed in a new concept. "Inas-
much as there is no single cause of crime, there can be no single cure of
criminal behavior. Therefore, correctional treatment must be individ-
ualized and based on the diagnosis of the individualized problems and
needs."'1  Thus, the concept of rehabilitation focuses on the individual as
a quality control mechanism within a dynamic society to screen out defec-
tive elements, rechannel them to be properly remolded, and provide for
their re-entry into society.
Even after spanning the gaps in the concepts of criminal law to rec-
P. TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE, AND CORRECTION 237 (1960).8 See generally Mueller, Punishment, Corrections and the Law, 45 NEB. L. REv.
58 (1966). See also P. TAPI'AN, CONTEMPORARY CORRECTION 3-13 (1951); P.
TAPPAN, supra note 7, at 241-59; Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 iLAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 401 (1958).
0P. TAPPAN, CONTEMPORARY CORuCTION 3 (1951).
10 Penegar, The Emerging "Right to Treatment'"-Elaborating the Processes
of Decision in Sanctioning Systems of the Criminal Law, 44 DENv. L.J. 163, 224
(1967).
11 See generally Alexander, Current Concepts in Correction, 30 FED. PROB. 3,
4 (1966).
12Id. at 5.
10Id. at 4. See also Penegar, supra note 10, at 204.
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ognize rehabilitation as a dominant goal, however, there are problems
inherent within the concept itself. All too often "individualization in
practice reflects more clearly the differences in the judges than in the
convicted offenders."' 4 Another problem is that emphasis on individual-
ization focuses attention on the individual and away from the offense.
There is always the danger to the individual "that he will be punished for
what he is believed to be, rather than for what he has done. The danger
to society is that the commands of the criminal law will be weaker."1 5l
The purposes and goals of the criminal process can be considered at
three levels: the legislative level of creation, the judicial level of imposi-
tion, and the administrative level of execution."0 While the legislature
must incorporate within the sentencing structure the values held by so-
ciety and the goals of the system, it is the judiciary which functions in the
all-important role of individualizing the abstractions of the law to the
offender for societal good. It is the judiciary that bears the burden of
activation of the rehabilitative ideal to the individual offender. The trend
of recent decisions, however, indicates that the judiciary has largely failed
to fulfill its obligation in the implementation of the major goals of the
criminal process.'
GUIDELINES
In light of the many variables involved, perhaps the greatest need of
the trial court is for sentencing guidelines. Sentencing measures and
alternatives run the gauntlet from the suspended sentence, probation, and
fines, to long term imprisonment, sterilization or castration, and death.' 8
Within the criminal process there exist numerous mitigative devices,',
P4 . TAPPAN, supra note 9, at 13.
' Hart, supra note 8, at 407-08.
' Mueller, supra note 8, at 82. This note will discuss only the judicial level of
imposition.17Penegar, supra note 10, at 224.
18See generally P. TAPPAN, supra note 7, at 422-26.
'9 Id. at 375. These devices are recognized:
(a) Police and prosecutor may discharge the accused after preliminary
hearing.
(b) The examining magistrate may discharge the accused after preliminary
hearing.
(c) The Grand Jury may refuse to indict.
(d) The prosecutor may decide to enter a nolle prosequi.
(e) The prosecutor or the court may agree to accept a plea to a lesser of-
fense than that originally charged.
(f) The trial jury may bring in a verdict of not guilty or convict for a les-
sor crime.
(g) Discretion may be exercised in sentencing to apply a lenient sentence,
whether it is probation or brief imprisonment.
[Vol. 47
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the indeterminate sentence being the most crucial.' With the two major
goals of the criminal process clearly in mind, a trial court judge must
impose the harsh realities of a sentence, yet counterbalance the necessity
for the sentence to express adequately the community's view of the gravity
of the offense against the necessity of a sentence that will be favorable in
rehabilitating the defendant.' Other than from the statutory provisions,22
few trial courts have available any concrete guidance in the development
of criteria that, when applied to each offender, will best promote the goals
of the criminal law. Only in those states which allow appellate review of
legal but excessive sentences is there a higher authority to provide guide-
lines to the trial judge in this crucial role of individualizing -the criminal
process.
In the majority of jurisdictions, a sentence within the statutory limits
for a proven offense is normally within the discretion of the trial court
and not subject to appellate reviewY'3 To allow appellate review would be
to allow a higher court to pass judgment on a factual decision of the trial
court.24 It has been said that "an appellate judge could never get the true
picture of a defendant and his sentence proceeding from the mere reading
(h) Sentence may be reduced in some jurisdictions through an appeal or
motion in mitigation of sentence.
(i) The convicted and incarcerated offender may be released on parole at
some time short of the expiration of his maximum sentence.
(j) A pardon may be secured from the executive.
" Within the statutory structure of indeterminate sentence laws, accompanied
by provisions for probation, is society's foral recognition of the rehabilitative
ideal within the criminal law. See generally Note, Statutory Structure For Sen-
tencing Felons to Prison, 60 CoLUM. L. REv. 1134, 1144-54 (1960).
a'Hart, supra note 8, at 437.
2' There exists at least one minimum mandate that guides every sentencing judge.
The eighth amendment of the U.S. CONSTITUTION requires that punishment can
be neither cruel nor unumal. Several recent cases have more precisely defined the
meaning of these terms. In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the court
decided that classification as a criminal and punishment by prison sentence of a
person suffering from an illness-narcotic addiction-was cruel and unusual punish-
ment. In Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968), a state court
of appeals held that confinement of a juvenile, convicted of rape, to prison for life
without privilege of parole constituted cruel and unusual punishment. See also
Beard v. Lee, 396 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Black v. United States, 269 F.2d 38
(9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 938 (1960) ; Edwards v. United States, 206
F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1953); Hemans v. United States, 163 F.2d 228 (6th Cir.
1947).
"=See, e.g., State v. Davis, 243 N.C. 754, 92 S.E.2d 177 (1956). See
Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sentence on Appeal, 37 CoLUM. L. REV. 521,
522 (1937) ; Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal But Exces-
sive Sentences, 15 VAND. L. REV. 671, 677 (1962); Note, Appellate Review of
Primary Sentencing Decisions: A Connecticut Case Study, 69 YALE L.J. 1453,
1452 (1960); Note, Statutory Stricture For Sentencing Felons to Prison, 60
CoLUM. L. REv. 1134, 1162 (1960).
' See generally Brewster, Appellate Review of Sentences, 40 F.R.D. 79 (1967).
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of a cold record, any more than he could learn how to milk a cow from
reading a book."'  Even so, fifteen American jurisdictions have either
specific statutes authorizing modification of legal but excessive sentences,
or precedents which have established such a procedure .2  An examination
of appellate decisions from each of these jurisdictions, however, has failed
to reveal any clear guidelines for the judge involved in the sentencing pro-
cess. Despite the importance and complexity of their decisions, the appel-
late courts have set few standards for the trial court to measure the appro-
priateness of its dispositive action. Appellate courts usually fail either to
articulate reasons for sentence reductions or to formalize criteria amenable
to rational analysis.
State Appellate Decisions
Many appellate courts have found it impossible to set guidelines and
standards, or have simply refused to do so. In Commonwealth v. Cater,
27
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: "This court has said time and
again that there are no fixed and immutable standards to be established
to guide trial courts in exercising their discretion." ' In State v. Doug-
la,29 the Arizona Supreme Court said that the trial judge "is to pass a
value judgment upon a human being for the society which he represents;
he is to sit as the conscience of the community. In the performance of this
duty, the trial judge is-to a certain extent-deprived of any set stan-
dards or legal guideposts.""0 Thus, the machinery of appellate review of
sentences has not been employed as a possible means of establishing any
general sentencing policy. Appellate courts all too often reverse excessive
legal sentences using, as sole criteria, phrases such as "after a careful
consideration of the facts," 1 or "when justice and right require," 2 or
"when the furtherance of justice requires." 83
In a few jurisdictions the trial court receives some minimum basic
guidance. A close scrutiny of several appellate decisions reveals certain
" Id. at 88.
20 Mueller, supra note 23, at 677, 688; Note, Statutory Structures For Sen-
tencing Felons to Prison, 60 CoLUM. L. REV. 1134, 1162-64 (1960). These juris-
dictions include: Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Massa-
chusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, and in the federal system, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
2' 396 Pa. 172, 152 A.2d 259 (1959).
28 Id. at 179, 152 A.2d at 263.
2" 87 Ariz. 182, 349 P.2d 622, cert. denied, 363 U.S. 815 (1960).
20 Id. at 188, 349 P.2d at 625.
1 Williams v. State, 52 Okla. Crim. 336, 339, 5 P.2d 410, 411 (1931).
2 Commonwealth v. Hawk, 328 Pa. 417, 418, 196 A. 5, 6 (1938).
"' State v. Ramirez, 34 Idaho 623, 634, 203 Pac. 279, 283 (1921).
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purposes of the sentencing process and criteria for individualization s 4
In Davis v. State,35 the Florida Supreme Court said that "[r] esponsibility
should be the basis of punishment, and individualization the criterion of
its application; such is the formula of modern penal law." 8 In State ex
rel. Shock v. Barnett,7 the Washington Supreme Court said that "[i]t is
contemplated that, in fixing of punishment, the trial court must maintain
a due regard for the dignity of the law, the protection of society, the re-
formation of the offender, and other considerations."" In State v. Wil-
son,s3 the Idaho Supreme Court said,
Whether the appellant was a good risk or a poor risk for probation is
not in itself decisive of the issues and possible rehabilitation is not the
controlling consideration. In cases of crimes committed against so-
ciety, the trial court must consider the protection of society, the de-
terrence of the individual and the public generally, the possibility of
rehabilitation and punishment for wrongdoings.
40
", From those jurisdictions allowing appellate review, the cases cited in the
text and those cited below are the better examples of appellate decisions which
shed some light on guidance for lower courts: State v. Phillips, 102 Ariz. 377, 430
P.2d 139 (1967); State v. Benn, 101 Ariz. 252, 418 P.2d 589 (1966); State v.
Stevens, 93 Ariz. 375, 381 P.2d 100 (1963) ; State v. Telavera, 76 Ariz. 183, 261
P.2d 997 (1953); Logan v. People, 138 Colo. 304, 332 P.2d 897 (1958); State v.
Lyman, 26 Conn. Supp. 70, 213 A.2d 73 (Sen. Rev. Div. 1965); State v. Tirella,
22 Conn. Supp. 25, 158 A.2d 602 (Sen. Rev. Div. 1959); State v. Gonski, 21 Conn.
Supp. 468, 159 A.2d 182 (Sen. Rev. Div. 1958) ; State v. O'Dell, 71 Idaho 64, 225
P.2d 1020 (1950); State v. Rinehart, 255 Iowa 1132, 125 N.W.2d 242 (1963);
State v. English, 242 Iowa 248, 46 N.W.2d 13 (1951) ; State v. Marcus, 240 Iowa
116, 34 N.W.2d 179 (1948) ; State v. De Stasio, 49 N.J. 247, 229 A.2d 636, cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967); Dickson v. State, 336 P.2d 1113 (Okla. Crim. App.
1959); Williams v. State, 321 P.2d 990 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957), af'd, 358 U.S.
576, reh. denied, 359 U.S. 956 (1959); Larkey v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 338,
245 P.2d 751 (Crim. App. 1952); Ex Parte Banks, 74 Okla. Crim. 1, 122 P.2d 181
(Crim. App. 1942); Tuel v. Gladden, 234 Ore. 1, 379 P.2d 553 (1963); Common-
wealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 151 A.2d 241 (1959).
" 123 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1960). The defendant pleaded guilty to rape of an
eleven year old girl and received the maximum penalty, death. An appeal for
mercy was denied by the sentencing judge in light of the circumstances and brutal
nature of the crime. The decision was affirmed on appeal.
'Id. at 711.
42 Wash. 2d 929, 259 P.2d 404 (1953). Defendant was convicted of a felony
-taking indecent liberties with a minor female-and sentenced to the penitentiary.
The court on appeal denied a request for probation and affirmed the judgment.18 Id. at 933, 259 P.2d at 406.
" 78 Idaho 385, 304 P.2d 644 (1956). Defendant, an adult, was convicted of
committing a "crime against nature" with a boy, fourteen years old. A pre-sen-
tence report indicated that the defendant was an habitual, persistent homosexual
offender. The trial court refused to hear testimony as to state facilities for treating
the defendant, prescribing an active sentence. The decision was affirmed in light
of the nature of the crime and character of the offender.
'Old, at 388, 304 P,2d at 646,
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All of these decisions clearly evidence a rehabilitative goal recognized by
the appellate courts, but one which truly is "bones without flesh"4 for
lack of any appropriate guiding criteria for individualization. A decision
handed down by the Connecticut Sentence Review Division ' is one of the
first to attempt the heretofore indefineable:
The sentencing problem is not one that yields to exact analysis, al-
though a proper sentence is desirably one that fits both the crime and
the individual. Such a sentence must of necessity take in many vari-
ables, including the gravity of the crime, both as to the particular cir-
cumstances of the offense charged, and the place of that crime in our
social order, the prior record of the defendant, the recidivistic factor
and the deterrent effect sought with reference to the commission of
that crime by others. 43
Over a period of four years prior to the decision in the Jones case, the
Illinois Appellate Courts have handed down at least seven 4 decisions,
which in view of the case analysis of all other jurisdictions, puts the state
years ahead in both recognition and application of the rehabilitative goals
of the criminal process. Appellate opinions have actually become working
tools for trial court judges. In People v. Evrard,4" the appellate court
said,
The court must strive to render a judgment which will adequately
punish the defendant for his misconduct, safeguard the public from
further offenses, and reform and rehabilitate the offender into a useful
member of society. In order to select an appropriate sentence, it is
"P. TAPPAN, .pra note 9, at 3.
2 State v. Kelii, 26 Conn. Supp. 215, 216 A.2d 849 (Sen. Rev. Div. 1965). The
defendant was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to not less than seven nor
more than fifteen years in prison. In a fit of rage he killed a man with whom his
wife was having an affair and who was mistreating the defendant's children under
the guise of discipline. The defendant's background included honorable service
and discharge from the coast guard and the national guard; an excellent employ-
ment record; no previous criminal record; no evidence of any recidivistic ten-
dency; a reliable, cooperative, and even-tempered character; and evidence of strong
love toward his family, regardless of the constant infidelity of his wife. The appel-
late court reduced the minimum sentence to five years.
'Id. at 218, 216 A.2d at 850.
"See note 6 supra.
"55 Ill. App. 2d 270, 204 N.E.2d 777 (1965). The defendant was convicted
of taking indecent liberties with a girl of 15 and sentenced to from one to three
years in prison. The defendant was 30 years of age, the father of two, and gain-
fully employed. He was intoxicated at the time of the incident. The appellate
court affirmed the conviction but remanded for re-evaluation of sentence, requiring
the trial court to hear all pertinent evidence as to the defendant's past history. The
court felt that the present record evidenced no recidivistic tendencies and that pro-
bation would be adequate.
[Vol. 47
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essential that the court be in possession of the fullest possible informa-
tion concerning the defendant's life and characteristics.40
The court is thus required to consider evidence of the defendant's "moral
character, life, family, occupation and criminal record"4 7 in aggravation
or mitigation of sentence. In People v. Nelson,4" the appellate court held
that where the record failed to show the education, family situation, back-
ground, or employment record of the defendant to any appreciable extent,
the sentence would be vacated and the cause remanded to the circuit court
for sentencing based upon the fullest information relevant to the defen-
dant. In People v. Lillie,4 the appellate court said,
Advances in the fields of psychology, psychiatry and sociology have
contributed to a greater understanding of the motives underlying the
commission of criminal offenses, and the techniques and methods which
are of value in the rehabilitation of offenders. The hope of earlier re-
lease is a great incentive to a prisoner to participate in the educational
and rehabilitative programs provided in modern penal institutions. Ex-
cessive minimum sentences, imposed by the courts, may defeat the
effectiveness of the parole system by making mandatory the incarcera-
tion of a prisoner long after effective rehabilitation has been accom-
plished.50
Federal Appellate Decisions
It has long been a uniform policy of federal appellate courts not to
consider a sentence within the statutory limits.51 The United States Su-
Id. at 274-75, 204 N.E.2d at 779.
' See note 4 supra.87 Ill. App. 2d 159, 231 N.E.2d 115 (1967). Defendant was convicted of
armed robbery and sentenced to from four to ten years in prison. Scant evidence
at trial revealed only that the defendant was twenty-four years old, a photographer,
had been convicted previously of second degree burglary, and used obscene
and disrespectful language while in jail awaiting trial. The appellate court re-
manded for re-sentencing based on a fuller knowledge of the defendant's past history
and personal characteristics.
" 79 Ill. App. 2d 174, 223 N.E.2d 716 (1967). Defendant, age twenty-three,
pleaded guilty to burglary in 1964 and was placed on probation. Thereafter pro-
bation was revoked and a sentence of from twelve to eighteen years in prison im-
posed. The defendant had previously been convicted of burglary and larceny, but
he had made restitution. Revocation of probation was brought on by charges of
disorderly conduct, reckless driving, and illicit sexual activity with minor females.
The appellate court reduced the minimum sentence to five years.
50Id. at 179, 223 N.E.2d at 719.
Weigel, Appellate Revision of Sentences: To Make the Punishment Fit the
Crite, 20 STAx. L. REv. 405, 411 (1968); Note, Appellate Review of Sentencing
Procedure, 74 YALE LJ. 379, 380 (1964). The leading case cited for this
rule is Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1930). The only exception
is the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which held a legal 3-year sentence
imposed by a district court excessive and remanded by exercising "its supervisory
1968]
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preme Court itself refused to "enter the domain of penology, and more
particularly that tantalizing aspect of it, the proper apportionment of
punishment,"5 stating that "[t]his court has no such power.' 53 Although
appellate review of criminal sentences in the federal courts has been pro-
posed in Congress, the Judicial Conference of the United States has re-
fused to recommend the adoption of such a procedure. 4 However, the
federal judiciary and Congress have not failed to envision a need for the
evaluation of sentence disparities and the promulgation of sentencing cri-
teria.
Federal Institutes
In August of 1958, a statute was enacted to authorize the establishment
of joint councils and institutes on sentencing under the auspices of the
Judicial Conference of the United States.5 The purposes of the institutes
were for study, discussion, and formulation of objectives, policies, stan-
dards, and criteria for sentencing in federal courts. Since the pilot insti-
tute, there have been fifteen additional sentencing institutes bringing to-
gether not only distinguished jurists, but also penologists and educators
as well." Out of these institutes have come enlightened ideas toward cri-
teria for sentencing standards. Many of the policies and standards of one
circuit have been accepted by other circuits. 7 In November of 1960, the
control of the district court, in aid to its appellate jurisdiction." United States v.
Wiley, 278 F.2d 500, 503 (7th Cir. 1960)."= Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958).
I d.
Note, Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions: A Connecticut
Case Study, 69 YALE L.J. 1453, 1453 & n.3 (1960).
"28 U.S.C. § 334 (1964). The Institutes are called at the request of the At-
torney General or the Chief Judge of each circuit.
" Youngdahl, Development and Accomplishments of Sentencing Institutes In
Federal Judicial System, 45 NEE. L. REV. 513, 514-15 (1960).
"' The ninth circuit in 1960 accepted "Policies and Standards for Sentencing"
set by the District of Columbia Circuit Sentencing Institute of 1960. These stan-
dards are set out in Appendix E of Sentencing Institutes, the Circuit Conference
of the Ninth Judicial Circuit, 27 F.R.D. 293, 389-91 (1960) and read as follows:
1. The purpose of a sentence combines community protection, correction,
rehabilitation, deterrence and punishment. The sentencing judge must
determine the proportionate worth, value and requirement of each of
these elements in imposing sentence in each case.
2. The prime consideration in proper sentencing is the public welfare.
Two major problems in sentencing are:
(a) to what extent and for what time does the community welfare re-
quire protection from this offender, or others, with respect to this
offense; and
(b) in the light of the answer to the first problem, what sentence will
permit this offender to take his place in society as a useful citizen
at the earliest time consistent with protection of the public.
[Vol. 47
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3. A proper sentence is a composite of many factors, including the nature
of the offense, the circumstances--extenuating or aggravating--of the
offense, the prior criminal record, if any, of the offender, the age of the
offender, all with reference to education, home life, sobriety, and social
adjustment, the emotional and mental condition of the offender, the
prospects for the rehabilitation of the offender, the possibility that the
sentence may serve as a deterrent to crime by this offender, or by others,
and the current community need, if any, for such a deterrent in respect
to the particular type of offense involved.
4. The protection of the community from confirmed and habitual crimi-
nals not reasonably susceptible of rehabilitation as useful citizens re-
quires the incarceration of such offenders, for maximum periods. The
protection of the community also requires that, to the extent a given
sentence may be expected to serve as an effective deterrent to the com-
mission of similar offences by others, this element should be given great
weight in the determination of the proper sentence. The public welfare
also requires, in general, the maximum use of probation and institu-
tionalized training in respect to offenders who are not confirmed crim-
inals and who manifest capacity for probable return to the community
as useful citizens.
5. There is little, if any, disparity in the sentences imposed by individual
judges in this circuit for violations of the same statute when all elements
of the offence and the offender are considered, as outlined in paragraph
3, supra. Despite seeming differences in specific cases, careful evalua-
tion of the cases discloses that the variables in each case, including the
defendant's prior criminal record, his background, educational and so-
cial status, his marital status, the number of his dependants, the con-
dition of his health, the prospect of rehabilitation and various other
elements, readily explain apparent differences in so-called similar cases.
6. Sentences which are merely mathematically identical for violations of
the same statute are improper, unfair, and undesirable. Indeed, mathe-
matically identical sentences may be themselves disparate. Each defen-
dant's case must be considered upon its highly individualized basis and
a sentence imposed which is tailored to fit that case. Sentencing judges
must in all instances consider all of the factors in each case, giving ap-
propriate weight to each factor, and impose a sentence which is just to
the defendant and just to the community.
7. The public need for sentences which serve as deterrents to crime may
vary from time to time and by type and frequency of offence.
8. A sentencing judge must determine in each case the deterrent effect
which the sentence in that case may have upon the offender. The de-
terrent effect of a sentence upon the other potential offenders with re-
spect to the possible commission of similar crimes and in respect to the
commission of crime generally is subject to different and varying view-
points. It is clear, however, that the most effective deterrent is certainty
and swiftness of punishment.
9. The use of the facilities provided by the Youth Correction Act in prop-
er cases appears to be most effective in the guidance, training and super-
vision of youthful offenders and their restoration to useful life in the
community.
10. It is proper, and often desirable, that a sentencing judge explain to an
offender in open court the purposes and meaning of a sentence about to
be imposed, especially when probation is granted.
11. Equal justice in sentencing is achieved by an experienced objective con-
sideration by the sentencing judge of all of the individual factors in
each case weighed in relation to the sentences imposed by other experi-
enced and objective judges in cases which are similar in respect to the
1968]
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judges of the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Michigan
instituted new procedures for sentencing.58 These procedures require that
prior to sentencing all trial judges must discuss proposed sentences with
other members of the court in an informal panel meeting. Prior to the
meeting, each judge on the Council receives a pre-sentence report and fills
out his recommendations on a chart. Awareness by the sentencing judge
that his thought processes will be exposed to the critical gaze of colleagues
should encourage more objective and principled attitudes towards sen-
tencing. The Council has tended to create consensus among the judges as
to the relevance and weight of factors in sentencing."0 The President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice en-
dorses sentencing institutes and conferences and urges each state to insti-
gate such programs on their own initiative. 0
Pre-Sentence Reports
Perhaps the most helpful tool ever devised for a sentencing judge is
the pre-sentence investigation report. Such a report is required in every
federal case, "unless the court directs otherwise." 1 The federal pre-sen-
tence report contains the defendant's prior criminal record, information
concerning his character, financial condition and the circumstances affec-
ting his behavior, and such other information as the court may requirer.
2
In 1960 of all persons convicted of federal offenses, eighty-six percent
were investigated and pre-sentence reports were prepared on their back-
grounds. Of these eighty-six percent, forty-two percent received proba-
tion.
63
The report of a pre-sentence investigation is made mandatory in some
circumstances by statutes in at least thirteen states." Even where no such
statutory authority exists, the majority of courts, at least in felony cases,
nature of the violation of law and background of the individual defen-
dant.68Levin, Toward a More Enlightened Sentencing Procedure, 45 NEB. L. REv.
499, 499-504 (1966).
91d. at 505.
60 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION or
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 145 (1967).
"1 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1), (as amended 1966).
'2 Id. at 32 (c) (2) (as amended 1966).
Se M. PAI SEN AND S. KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 168
(1962).
6' Note, Statutory Structure For Senteming Felons to Prison, 60 COLUM. L.
REv. 1134, 1135 & n.4 (1960). The states include: California, Colorado, Connecti-
cut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New
York, Rhode Island, Virginia, and New Jersey.
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may require such a report. 5 The purpose of the investigation is to glean,
from the defendant's past and present circumstances, information that
might indicate a potential for rehabilitation or show a definite propensity
toward crime. Many reports include an analytical summary of the sub-
ject's history and problems, with a recommendation to the court as to
his disposition.!6 The President's Commission on (Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice recommends that all courts require a pre-sen-
tence report for all offenders.6
Model Codes
Even absent beneficial appellate guidelines, there are other available
institutions that offer sound sentencing guides. The American Law In-
stitute has proposed a Model Penal Code8 8 which includes the following:
a statement of the purposes of punishment and treatment, 9 a statement
of criteria for withholding a prison sentence and placing an offender on
probation,70 a statement setting forth criteria for imposition of extended
" Note, Employment of Social Investigation Reports In Criminal and Juvenile
Proceedings, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 702, 703 (1958); Note, Statutory Structure For
Sentencing Felons to Prison, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 1134, 1134 n.5 (1960).
00 See generally 2 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES
156 (1939) ; P. TAPPAN, supra note 7, at 556-57 & n.50.
6 T
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 60, at 144.
o' MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1961).
601d. § 1.02(2).
The general purpose of the provisions governing the sentencing and
treatment of offenders are:
(a) to prevent the commission of offenses;
(b) to promote correction and rehabilitation of offenders;
(c) to safeguard offenders against excessive, disproportionate or arbitrary
punishment;
(d) to give fair warning of the nature of the sentences that may be imposed
on conviction of the offense;
(e) to differentiate among offenders with a view to a just individualiza-
tion in their treatment;
(f) to define, coordinate and harmonize the powers, duties and functions of
the courts and of administrative officers and agencies responsible for
dealing with offenders;
(g) to advance the use of generally accepted scientific methods and knowl-
edge in the sentencing and treatment of the offenders;
(h) to integrate responsibility for the administration of the correctional
system in a State Department of Correction.
70 Id. § 7.01.
(1) The Court shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime
without imposing sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the
nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character and con-
dition of the defendant, it is of the opinion that his imprisonment is neces-
sary for protection of the public because:
(a) there is undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or
probation the defendant will commit another crime; or
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terms of imprisonment for felons,"' a statement setting forth criteria for
(b) the defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided
most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or
(c) a lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's crime.
(2) The following grounds, while not controlling the discretion of the
Court, shall be accorded weight in favor of withholding sentence of im-
prisonment:
(a) the defendant's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious
harm;
(b) the defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would cause
or threaten serious harm;
(c) the defendant acted under a strong provocation;
(d) there were substantial grounds tending to excuse the defendant's crim-
inal conduct, though failing to establish a defense;
(e) the victim of the defendant's criminal conduct induced or facilitated its
commission;
(f) the defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim of his
criminal conduct for the damage or injury that he sustained;
(g) the defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity
or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the
commission of the present crime;
(h) the defendant's criminal conduct was the result of circumstances un-
likely to recur;
(i) the character and attitudes of the defendant indicate that he is unlikely
to commit another crime;
(j) the defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to proba-
tionary treatment;
(k) the imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to
himself or his dependents.
-*Id. § 7.03.
The Court may sentence a person who has been convicted of a felony to
an extended term of imprisonment if it finds one or more of the grounds
specified in this Section. The finding of the Court shall be incorporated in
the record.
(1) The defendant is a persistent offender whose commitment for an ex-
tended term is necessary for protection of the public.
The Court shall not make such a finding unless the defendant is over
tventy-one years of age and has previously been convicted of two felonies
or of one felony and two misdemeanors committed at different times when
he was over (insert Juvenile Court age) years of age.
(2) The defendant is a professional criminal whose commitment for an
extended term is necessary for protection of the public.
The Court shall not make such a finding unless the defendant is over the
age of twenty-one and:
(a) the circumstances of the crimes show that the defendant has know-
ingly devoted himself to criminal activity as a major source of
livelihood; or
(b) the defendant has substantial income or resources not explained to
be derived from a source other than criminal activity.
(3) The defendant is a dangerous, mentally abnormal person whose com-
mitment for an extended term is necessary for protection of the public.
(4) The defendant is a multiple offender whose criminality was so exten-
sive that a sentence of imprisonment for an extended term is warranted.
[Vol. 47
1968] THE SENTENCING PROCESS 191
the extended imprisonment of habitual misdemeanants, 72 and a section
recommending pre-sentence investigation.7' Also, the National Council
on Crime and Delinquency, through their Advisory Council of Judges,
has developed a Model Sentencing Act.74 This Act provides for a pre-
sentence investigation, 75 sets forth criteria for sentencing standards, 7 and
provides a requirement that the trial court judge make a brief statement
of his basic reasons for the sentence that he imposes.
7 7
Prediction Methods
There exists still another source of guidance for the sentencing judge.
By the use of prediction methods, a judge is able to arrive at some estimate
of the defendant's post-correctional conduct. Considering the statistical
experience of the community in sentencing particular classes of defendants
to prison or placement on probation, the judge's intuitive process of pre-
dicting the defendant's subsequent behavior can now be developed into a
more rational process of analysis and into more precise, concrete terms. 7s
In the Glueck study79 of five hundred criminals in a Massachusetts re-
formatory over a period of five years, social factors and behavioral pat-
terns of each offender were analyzed from childhood through parole. Cor-
relation tables were made and validation studies run. The Gluecks came
up with five factors 0 that showed the highest correlation to post-parole
conduct. These were given relative weights and incorporated into a table.
From such a table it is now possible to predict post-release behavior prior
to sentencing.81
The Research Division of the California Department of Correction
7 Id. § 7.04.
1 Id. § 7.07. Few states have adopted the provisions in the sections above.
Some of the more progressive states have enacted similar kinds of provisions,
though none are as extensive as those of the model code. See CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 1203 (West Supp. 1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1-2, 117-1 (Smith-Hurd
1964); N.Y. PEN. LAW §§ 1.05 & 70.10 (McKinney 1967).71 ADVISORY COUNCIL OF JUDGES OF TnE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CRIME AND
DELINQUENCY, MODEL SENTENCING ACT (1963).
71 Id. art. 2, § 2.
70 Id. art. 3, § 5.
7"Id. art. 3, § 10.
J. CONRAD, CRImE AND ITS CORRECTION 191 (1965).
" Glueck, Predictive Devices and the Individualization of Jiustice, 23 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 461, 471-72 (1958).
" Id. at 472. The factors are: (1) seriousness and frequency of pre-reformatory
crime, (2) arrest for crimes preceding the offense for which sentence to the re-
formatory had been imposed, (3) penal experience preceding reformatory incar-
ceration, (4) economic responsibility preceding sentence to the reformatory, and
(5) mental abnormality.
81 Id.
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has developed a system of base expectancies that are applicable to various
correctional populations.82 Equations were developed to differentiate risks
according to similar kinds of demographic attributes, with twelve factors
incorporated into a base expectancy table.3 The judge might then weigh
the risk of recidivism against the hazard of the kind of crime to be ex-
pected. "A thirty percent prospect of homicide must be viewed in a dif-
ferent light than an equal prospect of shoplifting. Nothing in sight offers
the judge complete relief from the burden of the risk-laden decision." s4
It is the aim under this new system to cut imprisonment or commitment
to state institutions by twenty-five percent with a savings extended over a




In relation to judicial activation of the rehabilitative ideal through
individualization, sentencing is presently still "the most neglected part of
the most neglected field of the law, criminal law."8 0s Even recognizing a
rehabilitative ideal predominant within the criminal process, only a few
courts have taken any modern, realistic approach in applying the ideal
through the sentencing process. Trial judges must be apprised of the fact
that individualization can be achieved only through systematic analysis
of crucial criteria relevant to each offender. The rehabilitative ideal must
be recognized and supported at the legislative level; but, individualization
J2 . CoNRAD, supra note 78, at 185-89.
McGee, Objectivity in Predicting Criminal Behavior, 42 F.R.D. 175, 195
(1966). The factors and their weights are:
An arrest-free period of five years or more 12
No history of opiate use 9
Two or less jail commitments 8
The charge is not checks or burglary 7
No family criminal record 6
No alcohol involvement related to offense 6
Not first arrested on auto theft 5
Six or more consecutive months of work for one employer 5
No aliases 5
First imprisonment under this serial number 5
Favorable living arrangements 4
Few prior arrests (zero, one or two) 4
76
A score of 53 or higher gives the defendant a
seventy-five percent chance of success.
8'J. CoNRAD, supra note 78.
"' McGee, supra note 83, at 185.
" Barkin, Sentencing Problems, 39 F.R.D. 523, 524 (1965).
LAY OPINION AND NARCOTICS
can only be activated by the judiciary through the sentencing process.
Failure here weakens the rehabilitative ideal. The judiciary must recog-
nize its crucial role within the criminal process before this ideal can be
transformed into reality.
DONALD W. STEPHENS
Evidence-Lay Opinion as to Whether a Person is Under
the Influence of Narcotics
In State v. Cook1, defendants appealed from a conviction of posses-
sion of a quantity of barbiturates without a prescription.2 One of the
defendants' objections related to the admission of the testimony of a
police officer that, in his opinion, based on his observation, the defen-
dants were under the influence of narcotics.3 Apparently, the officer was
not qualified as an expert. The court, however, did not feel this neces-
sary. Relying on a long line of North Carolina cases4 allowing a lay
witness to give his opinion when, by reason of better opportunities for
observation, he is in a better position than the jury to make a judgment,
the court stated: "Seeing defendants in their drugged condition and
observing their manner of speech and movement, the witness was better
qualified than the jury to draw inferences and conclusions from what
he saw and heard."' A rule permitting admission of lay opinion regard-
ing people under the influence of narcotics ventures beyond the limits
1273 N.C. 377, 160 S.E.2d 49 (1968).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.2(3) (1965).
He testified that defendants were "sleepy . . .had glassy dilated eyes ....
They were "in a stupor . . .mumbling . . .staggering." 273 N.C. at 381, 160
S.E.2d at 52. He also mentioned the fact that there was no odor of alcohol
about them. Id. This last fact implies that his opinion was at least partially
arrived at by the process of elimination (i.e., since they were not drinking, their
conduct could be explained only by drugs). The accuracy of this method, stand-
ing alone, seems doubtful.
'Greensboro v. Garrison, 190 N.C. 577, 130 S.E. 203 (1925) ; State v. Brodie,
190 N.C. 554, 130 S.E. 205 (1925); Hill & Brooks v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co.,
186 N.C. 475, 119 S.E. 884 (1923); Sheperd v. Sellers, 182 N.C. 701, 109 S.E.
847 (1921); Marshall v. Interstate Tel. & Tel. Co., 181 N.C. 292, 106 S.E. 818
(1921).
273 N.C. at 381, 160 S.E.2d at 52. It should be noted that the court said:
"Seeing defendants in their drugged condition .... " Id. Whether or not defen-
dants were drugged was one of the factual issues in dispute. The court, by this
language, assumed what was to be proven. It was merely the policeman's opinion
that defendants were in a "drugged condition."
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